2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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National report of Mexico on measures taken to implement the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

Introduction

1. Mexico is firmly attached to its pacifist approach and is an active proponent of disarmament and non-proliferation education as an effective means of helping to achieve the vital objective of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

2. It believes it is essential and urgent to take action to promote a culture of disarmament and is calling on the international community to increase its efforts to free present and future generations from the scourge of war. Accordingly, the Mexican Government wants to make disarmament and non-proliferation education a key component of its foreign policy so that the results may be reflected in the conscience of present and future generations, to the benefit of all mankind.

3. Mexico is convinced that, as noted in the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education (A/57/124 of 30 August 2002) prepared by a Group of Governmental Experts headed by Ambassador Miguel Marín-Bosch, there has never been a greater need for education in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation, especially with regard to weapons of mass destruction.

4. In keeping with Mexico's interest in encouraging the adoption of measures on this crucial issue in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its review mechanism, the Government is submitting to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties its national report on the measures it has taken to implement the recommendations contained in the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education pursuant to General Assembly resolution 57/60 of 22 November 2002.

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National measures adopted by Mexico

5. The steps taken by Mexico in order to implement the recommendations contained in the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education are as follows:

(a) During the preparatory process for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Mexico joined other countries in putting forward working papers on disarmament and non-proliferation education (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.18, of 7 May 2004, and NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.17, of 29 April 2004);

(b) In June 2004, the Government submitted to the United Nations Secretariat a report on the measures it has taken to implement the recommendations contained in the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education in accordance with General Assembly resolution 57/60;

(c) Paragraph 30 of the political declaration (ZLAN/CONF/5) adopted by the Conference of States Parties and signatories of treaties that establish nuclear-weapons-free zones, held in Tlatelolco, Mexico, from 26 to 28 April 2005, refers to the issue stating that members of such zones are convinced that disarmament and non-proliferation education is an important measure that can contribute to the achievement of a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons. It also invites all States to promote programmes to instil the values of peace, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in their respective educational and academic circles and calls on IAEA and donor countries to help in the promotion and implementation of such programmes;

(d) The competent Mexican authorities are engaged in the process of establishing a chair of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for disarmament and non-proliferation education at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, our country's largest and most representative higher education institution;

(e) Mexico plans to incorporate subjects concerning nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation into the primary education curriculum in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Education;

(f) Through resolutions, Mexico has continued to promote the inclusion of the topic in the agendas of various international and regional forums such as the Organization of American States and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean;

(g) Mexico has continued to benefit from the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Programme, which has provided training for several generations of Mexican diplomats who are now involved in determining foreign policy in disarmament and non-proliferation matters within the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs or are attached to Mexican delegations and missions abroad which deal with international disarmament forums and bodies. It has put forward a candidate for the Programme for 2005;

(h) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has instituted the practice of sharing theoretical and practical knowledge concerning disarmament and non-proliferation

issues with young people who have decided to do their community service or internship[1] there, some of whom later join the staff of the Ministry;

(i) In view of the important role of electronic channels in furthering disarmament and non-proliferation education, the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs intends to place a disarmament and non-proliferation portal on its website.

[1] In Mexico community service is a requirement for all University students who wish to get a degree. Some institutions of higher learning require that their students complete an internship.

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Steps taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Report submitted by Egypt

General

1. Pursuant to the report submitted by Egypt to the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of the Nuclear Weapons (see NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/26), Egypt has the honour to submit the present follow-up report, which sets forth the steps Egypt has taken during the past year to promote the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

I. Introduction

2. The inherent right of any group of States to conclude regional arrangements with a view to eliminating nuclear weapons in their respective territories was one of the fundamental principles guiding the drafting process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and was later incorporated in article VII of the Treaty. Since the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, Egypt has worked continuously to realize the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

3. In this context, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East has remained an item of high priority on Egypt's diplomatic agenda, after nearly 30 years of efforts to rid the Middle East of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

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II. Egyptian efforts at the international level

4. As in past years, Egypt submitted a resolution to the General Assembly of the United Nations at its fifty-ninth session on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (resolution 59/63). The resolution, which was adopted without a vote, "urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". The resolution furthermore "invites the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone ..." It is important to note that since 1974, the General Assembly has annually adopted a resolution on this matter, and since 1980, the resolution has been adopted by consensus.

5. Egypt, on behalf of the States Member of the United Nations that are Members of the League of Arab States, also submitted a resolution entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", which was adopted by a majority of 170 Member States (resolution 59/106). The resolution "reaffirms the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East". The resolution also calls upon Israel "to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without further delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security".

6. Upon Egypt's initiative, the General Conference of IAEA, at its forty-eighth session, once again adopted by consensus a resolution (GC(48)/RES/16) entitled "Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East". The resolution "affirms the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all their nuclear activities as an important confident-building measure among all States in the region and as a step in enhancing peace and security in the context of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ)". The resolution also "calls upon all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and appropriate steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable NWFZ in the region ..." and upon all States "especially those with a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to render all assistance to the Director General by facilitating the implementation of this resolution". In this context, Egypt fully supported the efforts of the Director General to "make arrangements to convene a forum in which participants from the Middle East and other interested parties could learn from the experiences of other regions, including in the area of confidence-building relevant to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone". It is important to note, however, that which Egypt extended its full pledged support and cooperation for the goal of convening the forum, Israel regrettably obstructed the convening of the said forum by attempting to formulate an

agenda that can only lead to doubts about the possibility of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region and obfuscate the main obstacles that lead to the failure to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

7. The support of the international community for the three aforementioned resolutions and its continuous reiteration of the importance of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region bears testament to the international community's continuous concern over the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and the urgency surrounding this issue. Egypt regrets, however, that little has been done to translate this sense of urgency into concrete measures to rid the region of nuclear weapons.

8. Egypt also actively participated in the conference hosted by Mexico in April 2005 on nuclear-weapon-free zones. The final declaration of the Conference reiterated the support of participating States for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and, in this regard, reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East. The New Agenda Coalition, of which Egypt is a member, also pronounced itself on this issue in a similar manner.

III. Egyptian efforts at the regional level

9. At the regional level, Egypt continued to play an active role within the framework of the League of Arab States on issues relating to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It has participated in the adoption of several resolutions on subjects that fall within the scope of the Treaty. These include resolution 6444 regarding the impact of Israeli weapons of mass destruction on international peace and Arab national security and resolution 6445, calling for the establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the region of the Middle East, with special emphasis on the elimination of nuclear weapons.

10. Egypt is also a member of the technical committee of the Arab League charged with formulating a draft treaty on the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The Committee held meetings in Cairo in June 2004 and January 2005.

11. Egypt also reported, in its submission to the second and third sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference in 2003 and 2004, on its contribution to a symposium held in Cairo in February 2003, which was jointly organized by the League of Arab States and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The symposium was entitled "Building a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East: Global Non-Proliferation Regimes and Regional Experiences".

IV. Egyptian efforts at the national level

12. Egypt's strong commitment to the objective of ridding the Middle East of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction was reaffirmed at the national level in the address given by President Hosni Mubarak to a joint session of the Egyptian Parliament on 16 November 2002, in which he stated: "We continue to

call — insistently — for the same standards to be applied to Israel as are applied to Iraq so that it may abandon all its capabilities in the field of weapons of mass destruction as one of the main elements for a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, and that will strengthen international efforts to prevent the proliferation of such weapons, in the view of the threat they pose to all mankind." The President's remarks were further echoed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a meeting with the Director General of the IAEA in 2004, in which he stressed the importance of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as a necessary precondition for the realization of a lasting peace in the region.

13. Also at the national level, and within the context of its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Egypt continued to receive IAEA inspections teams throughout the past year. All of the inspections illustrated Egypt's compliance with its commitments under the safeguards agreement with the Agency.

14. Egyptian civilian society has also been adamant in its call for ridding the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction. In January 2005, a joint meeting by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and the Freidrich Ebert Stiftung called for the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and the establishment of a mutually verifiable weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the region.

V. Conclusion

15. Throughout the past year, Egypt has continued to explore every avenue that could lead to concrete progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It believes that others, especially those in the Middle East region, should make an equally strong commitment. In the case of Israel, this commitment has not been forthcoming. Egypt would like to point out that while all States in the Middle East region have become parties to the Treaty, Israel regrettably persists in ignoring repeated calls for its adherence to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament"

Report submitted by Norway

1. The present report presents the steps taken by Norway to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament". The report focuses on the 13 practical steps of the 2000 Final Document, which is the most recent elaboration of the obligations embodied in article VI and the "Principles and Objectives". Reference is also made to a Norwegian position paper tabled at the 2005 Review Conference as well as a paper on Norway's contribution to the implementation of the Treaty.

Step 1: the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

2. Norway signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at an early stage. Universal adherence to and early entry into force of the Treaty continues to be a high priority. Norway has worked towards this goal by actively promoting signature and ratification of the Treaty and by supporting the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna in implementing the Treaty's verification mechanism.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mr. Jan Petersen, has signed a joint ministerial statement in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Norway has co-sponsored resolutions in the General Assembly calling for the early entry into force of the Treaty.

4. Norway has on several occasions expressed the view, notably at the two conferences on article XIV, the meetings of the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 Review Conference and at the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, that it is of crucial importance that the nuclear-weapon States ratify the Treaty without delay and that the remaining States parties listed in annex II to the Treaty do so as well. In order to accelerate the ratification process, Norway has

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granted financial assistance to selected countries from the list of 44 States through the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in Vienna.

Step 2: Test moratorium

5. Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, it is important that the moratorium on tests remains. Norway advocates that such self-imposed moratoria cannot, however, replace legally binding commitments through the signing and ratification of the Treaty.

6. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty establishes a far-reaching global monitoring and verification system, capable of detecting all relevant nuclear explosions. The verification system is thus at the core of the Treaty. The full implementation of the International Monitoring System as soon as possible, without waiting for the entry into force of the Treaty, would represent a significant confidence and security-building measure. Six monitoring stations comprising altogether 119 field instruments are located on Norwegian territory as part of the International Monitoring System. With the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1999, the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) was established as the Norwegian National Data Centre for verification of compliance with the Treaty.

Step 3: Fissile material cut-off treaty

7. Norway considers it a top priority for the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. Such a treaty is the next logical step on the multilateral arms control agenda and is essential if we are to advance nuclear non-proliferation. Over the last five years Norway has co-sponsored a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly calling for an early commencement of negotiations on such a treaty.

8. As long as the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament remains, Norway welcomes the ongoing parallel process to identify and assess particular and technical aspects of a fissile material cut-off treaty. It is necessary to deal with the entire field of weapons-usable material in a comprehensive manner. All nuclear-weapon States should conclude and implement arrangements to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under the IAEA verification regime. Norway advocates the principle of irreversible disposition in order to ensure that excess stockpiles of fissile material remain outside the military cycle. To that end, IAEA monitoring is required.

Step 4: Nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament

9. Norway has expressed concern about the continued deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament and has supported efforts to agree on a programme of work, including the cross-regional initiative as well as its revised version. This proposal calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to consider nuclear disarmament.

Step 5: Irreversibility

10. Norway has repeatedly expressed support for the principle of irreversibility in arms control and nuclear disarmament. Irreversible reductions of existing stockpiles constitute an effective non-proliferation measure that prevents terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons and nuclear material.

Step 6: Unequivocal undertaking

11. Norway considers this commitment as highly relevant in attaining the overall objective of article IV.

Step 7: Strategic arms agreements

12. Norway welcomes the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on further reductions in strategic nuclear warheads. Reductions in the numbers of operationally deployed strategic warheads will be an important contribution to the implementation of the decisions of the 2000 Review Conference and to continued strategic stability and enhanced security in the new international context. While welcoming reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, Norway underlines the need for verifiable, transparent and irreversible reductions.

Step 8: Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency

13. Norway holds the view that emphasis should be given to the completion and full implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, the Russian Federation and International Atomic Energy Agency. Efforts could be made to expand this arrangement to all nuclear-weapon capable States, as an important step in the direction of international control of excessive stocks of fissile material and deeper cuts in nuclear arms.

Step 9: Steps by the nuclear-weapon States

14. Norway strongly supports increased transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals. At the 2000 Review Conference we introduced proposals in this respect, together with Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. We also would like to refer to the working papers tabled by Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway at the second and thirds meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference as well as the working paper tabled at the 2005 Review Conference.

15. We also encourage transparency through the conclusion of safeguards agreements with IAEA. We urge all those States that have not yet signed or ratified an Additional Protocol to do so without delay.

16. Norway has welcomed the unilateral declarations by the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation in 1991 and 1992, which aim for the

elimination of a great number of tactical nuclear weapons. In the view of Norway these declarations are still relevant and should be preserved and strengthened. We encourage the adoption of transparency measures such as reporting on the implementation of these two important declarations and reciprocal information exchange by the two countries involved. In this regard we would like to point to the transparency measures that NATO has proposed to the Russian Federation. Norway hopes to see an early start of further negotiations on substantial cuts in the arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons.

17. Norway emphasizes the need for continued reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapons as well as for a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies.

Step 10: Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States on fissile material

18. Norway has advocated that a fissile material cut-off treaty should also deal with existing stocks in order to have a full and genuine disarmament impact. Norway has consistently encouraged nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for disposition.

19. The Norwegian Government sponsored an international conference on nuclear material management, which was held in Oslo on 3 and 4 March 2005.

20. As regards bilateral cooperation programmes, for over 10 years Norway has had bilateral cooperation with the Russian Federation on nuclear safety issues. Since 1995, Norway has allocated $150 million United States dollars, mainly to the Russian Federation, through a plan of action for nuclear safety. The plan of action concentrates on four main areas: nuclear safety; safety of nuclear fuel and radioactive waste; monitoring of radioactive contamination; and weapons-related environmental problems. This assistance facilitates and speeds up the ongoing programme on dismantling decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines with nuclear fuel on board.

Step 11: General and complete disarmament

21. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues remain central elements in Norwegian foreign policy.

Step 12: Reporting

22. Norway believes that national reports by States parties should contain regular, systematic and detailed information to the other States parties with the goal of improving the functioning of the Treaty's strengthened review process. In submitting its national report, Norway shares the view that reporting should be done by all States parties and that it should be obligatory rather than optional.

Step 13: Development of verification

23. Norway supports the further development and strengthening of verification capabilities, which is clearly linked to the issue of compliance. We have taken a number of steps to support verification regimes under various arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, including the above-mentioned International Monitoring System for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Norway co-sponsored the resolution entitled "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification", which was adopted at the fifty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

24. Norway also supports the verification regimes of IAEA. Its agreement with IAEA on comprehensive safeguards was signed in 1972, while its agreement on the Additional Protocol entered into force in 2000. IAEA has conducted several inspections within the framework of the Additional Protocol. The measures contained in the IAEA model Additional Protocol are important for the Agency's efforts with regard to nuclear non-proliferation and as a new verification standard. It strengthens the effectiveness of the comprehensive IAEA safeguards system. Norway advocates making the Additional Protocol mandatory.

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National report of Guatemala as called for in the 2000 review of the operation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, with a focus on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the decision adopted in 1995 on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

Report submitted by Guatemala

1. With the aim of building on the progress achieved in the implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the decision adopted in 1995 on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and in support of the 13 practical steps towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, Guatemala, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, presents the following report:

2. **Step 1**: Signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

3. Guatemala expresses its renewed support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which it signed on 20 September 1999. The ratification process is still at the stage of analysis and debate in the Congress of the Republic. Nonetheless, Guatemala urges the States listed in annex 2 to that Treaty to ratify it as promptly as possible so that it can speedily enter into force.

4. In addition, Guatemala ratified the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water on 6 January 1964. On 6 February 1970, Guatemala ratified the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), thereby becoming part of the first inhabited nuclear-weapon-free zone. Subsequently, on 1 April 1996, Guatemala ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and

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Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.[1]

5. In order to contribute to the speedy ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization conducted a seminar at the national level in March 2005 in Antigua, Guatemala, with high-level participation, including from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Congress of the Republic, to make participants better acquainted with that Treaty and its importance. Guatemala has been a State member of the Preparatory Commission since 20 September 1999.[2]

6. Guatemala also offered to host a regional seminar, scheduled for October 2005, promoting speedy ratification of the Treaty.

7. **Step 2**: A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

8. Although Guatemala has no nuclear or related technology, it reaffirms its support for the maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear testing of any kind pending the entry into force of the Treaty. It also invites the nuclear-weapon States to declare such a moratorium as promptly as possible.

9. **Step 3**: The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

10. Guatemala considers that it would be desirable for the State members of the Conference on Disarmament to undertake negotiations as soon as possible on a legally binding multilateral instrument, of international scope and with a verification mechanism, which would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The member delegations will need to reach agreement on, among other things, the establishment of a negotiating committee, open to all members, to elaborate such an instrument.

11. Guatemala regularly joined the consensus on a resolution on the topic submitted annually. When for the first time such a resolution was submitted to a vote, on 3 December 2004, Guatemala voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 59/81 on the Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

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[1] See http://disarmament.un.org:8080/TreatyStatus.nsf.

[2] See http://www.ctbto.org.

12. However, Guatemala reiterates and confirms its inalienable right under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and under the Treaty of Tlatelolco to acquire, develop and participate in nuclear technology in the future, solely for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in accordance with articles I. II and III of the Treaty, particularly with a view to accelerating socio-economic development.

13. From that standpoint, Guatemala supports multilateral and international cooperation initiatives to benefit developing countries, particularly those directed towards Guatemala itself and the Central American region.

14. Guatemala holds the presidency of the Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean (ARCAL) for 2005, under the Technical Cooperation Programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Upon assuming the presidency of ARCAL, Guatemala proposed to the member States that they should elaborate and submit to IAEA a proposal for an ARCAL/IAEA strategic alliance. The proposal met with the firm support of the members and the Agency, which is providing technical support for the elaboration of the proposal.[3]

15. **Step 4**: The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

16. As in the case of step 3, Guatemala favours the establishment of one or more subsidiary bodies open to all member States to deal with questions of nuclear disarmament, a step that the States members of the Conference on Disarmament should take at the first opportunity.

17. **Step 5**: The principle of irreversibility [is] to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

18. Guatemala reaffirms the principle of irreversibility as applicable to all arms reduction measures for all types of weapons and to the related measures of verification and transparency.

19. **Step 6**: An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.

20. Guatemala urges the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear arsenals in a clear and transparent manner.

21. **Step 7**: The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

22. Guatemala views favourably the initiative to apply the principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility in the Treaty between the United States

[3] Embassy of Guatemala in Vienna, fax No. 71-05/E31, dated 26 April 2005.

of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions through the destruction by the United States of America and the Russian Federation of their strategic nuclear warheads. It also urges them to formulate a plan for the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons within the framework of the START III programme.

23. **Step 8**: The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

24. Guatemala urges the effective implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

25. **Step 9**: Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

- Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;
- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;
- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

26. Guatemala takes note of the general progress made since the previous review conference in terms of the reduction of arsenals, the used transparency mechanisms and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and voluntary confidence-building measures, such as the accession by Timor-Leste and Cuba to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the voluntary decision of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 19 December 2003 to eliminate its materials, equipment and programmes intended for the production of weapons of mass destruction as a further step towards achieving the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.[4] However, Guatemala regrets the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Treaty and urges it to re-accede to the Treaty and to implement its provisions as soon as possible.

[4] Final inputs by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Chapter in Vienna, States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in preparation for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, New York, 2-27 May 2005, article VI, p. 5.

27. Guatemala reaffirms its commitment to combating terrorism, particularly in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). In compliance with the resolution, Guatemala has submitted five national reports to the Counter-Terrorism Committee.[5]

28. Guatemala also shares the concern that weapons of mass destruction might fall into the hands of non-State actors. Since it is convinced that the best means to prevent this is through the total elimination of such weapons, it welcomes the preventive initiatives that have been instituted, such as those under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Guatemala has already submitted its first national report[6] to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).[7]

29. **Step 10**: Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

30. Guatemala urges the nuclear-weapon States, as called for in step 10, to make further efforts to place all fissile material under IAEA or other relevant verification. It also supports arrangements to use this material for peaceful purposes, in order to ensure that it remains permanently outside any military programme and, above all, beyond the reach of terrorists.

31. **Step 11**: Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

32. Guatemala reaffirms its commitment to implement all the multilateral instruments it has ratified relating to disarmament in general, under the effective control and with the cooperation of the international community.

33. In this connection, the Government of Guatemala, through Government Order No. 191-2004, has established the National Commission for Disarmament, on a temporary basis for two years, whose mandate is to formulate and coordinate implementation of a national disarmament programme within the framework of the public safety policy. The mandate also includes strengthening the arms and ammunition act; collecting illegal weapons; destroying confiscated and/or stored illegal weapons; strengthening the National Civil Police; reinforcing points of import and export; and implementing public awareness programmes.[8]

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[5] Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations, New York, 26 April 2005: the first national report was submitted on 25 December 2001; the second, on 8 July 2002; the third, on 17 March 2003; the fourth, on 10 March 2004; and the fifth, on 15 April 2005.

[6] Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations, New York, 26 April 2005.

[7] In its resolution 1540 (2004) of 5 November 2004, paragraph 4, the Security Council "*[d]ecides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all members of the Council, which will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to present a first report no later than six months from the adoption of this resolution to the Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this resolution".

[8] See: International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), http://www.iansa.org/regions/camerica/iepades.htm, Guatemala, National Commission for Disarmament.

34. Guatemala has an arms and ammunition act, Decree No. 38-89 of the Congress of the Republic, which refers to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in articles 4 and 13, and provides for punitive measures in articles 93, 95 and 97 (c), among others, of title VII.

35. Guatemala also has a law concerning the control, use and application of radioisotopes and ionizing radiation (Decree-Law No. 11-86), with implementing regulations (Government Order No. 055-2001) and regulations governing radioactive waste management (Government Order No. 559-98) which also controls the use and application of radioisotopes and ionizing radiation and protects the health of workers and the general public. This instrument provides, among other things, for a verification mechanism, a waste register, a licensing regime and a system of penalties and fines.[9]

36. The Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America entered into force for Guatemala on 28 October 1999. This instrument is supplementary to the Tegucigalpa Protocol to the Charter of the Organization of Central American States and seeks to reduce armaments, foster stability and promote confidence and transparency. The Treaty confirms the commitments entered into under the Treaty of Tlatelolco and other multilateral instruments related to disarmament.[10]

37. Guatemala invites the international community in general to participate in national disarmament programmes through international cooperation and through physical and visual inspections at any time by international representatives and members of the press, as the most efficient method for transparency and verification.

38. **Step 12**: Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

39. Guatemala is conscious of the responsibility of the States parties for the implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty. It therefore reaffirms its commitment to report to the international community, within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on the implementation of article VI.

40. Guatemala could join any consensus on the submission of periodic reports. However, owing to the fact that there is no nuclear activity of any kind within the country, the Government of Guatemala feels that submission of a report prior to each review conference would be sufficient. These reports could be supplemented by the obligation under article XIV of the Treaty of Tlatelolco to submit semi-annual reports simultaneously to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the

[9] Ministry of Energy and Mines of Guatemala: http://www.mem.gob.gt/mem/4.htm. Article 19 of the Mining Law (Decree-Law No. 69-85) covered regulations for and restrictions on the mining of radioactive minerals in the country. However, this Law was repealed by Decree-Law No. 41-93 which, in turn, was repealed by Article 94 of the Mining Law (Decree-Law No. 48-97). Unlike in previous Decree-Laws, this article no longer mentions the mining of radioactive minerals.

[10] Seventeenth Summit meeting of Central American Presidents. See website: http://www.sieca.org.gt/publico/Reuniones_Presidentes/xvii/tratado1.htm.

Organization of American States indicating that no activity prohibited under the Treaty has occurred in national territory.

41. **Step 13**: The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

42. With a view to developing verification capabilities and transparency and in compliance with the provisions of the Protocol to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty — as contained in part I thereof entitled "The International Monitoring System and International Data Centre function" — a type 3-C auxiliary seismological monitoring station capable of detecting seismic movements throughout the country and in Central America is being installed in the Department of Alta Verapaz, Guatemala, at the RDG Rabir site (latitude 15.0° N and longitude 90.5° W).

43. The installation of these international surveillance and verification systems results from an agreement signed in 2002 between Guatemala and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.